The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently examined United States v. Blocker, 174 F.4th 587 (7th Cir. 2026). This case highlights that agreeing to terms of service can constitute valid consent for a company to scan files and report illegal material to authorities.
Summary of the Facts
This case involves Dropbox, a commonly used cloud storage service that allows users to store files online, sync them across devices, and share them with others. It is also used for collaboration, backup, and keeping files accessible from a user’s phone, computer, or browser.
Access to Dropbox depends on accepting its terms of service. Those terms state that users retain ownership of their data, while Dropbox claims no authorship, ownership, or right to publish it. They also allow Dropbox to inspect data to ensure that its platform is not being used for unlawful purposes, such as fraud, copyright infringement, or obscenity. Another provision allows Dropbox to share information with third parties when disclosure is reasonably necessary to comply with the law or legal process, protect someone from serious harm, prevent fraud or abuse, protect Dropbox’s rights or safety, or carry out a task in the public interest.
In 2018, Dropbox informed the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) that Adam Blocker was sharing files containing child pornography with third parties. Dropbox sent the files to NCMEC, which notified federal authorities. The FBI obtained a search warrant for Blocker’s electronic storage accounts and devices. That search uncovered additional illegal images beyond those Dropbox had sent to NCMEC.
Blocker filed a motion to suppress the files Dropbox sent to NCMEC and the evidence discovered on his computer. The district court denied the motion, finding that Blocker had consented to Dropbox searching content uploaded to its platform when he agreed to its terms of service. Ultimately, Blocker pleaded guilty to two counts related to child pornography while retaining his right to appeal.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
On appeal, Blocker argued that Dropbox’s terms were merely “fine print” that users accepted primarily to gain access to the service. He also argued that the terms were too vague to constitute consent to search a customer’s data when a public agency such as NCMEC might have an interest in it.
The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the Fourth Amendment applies only to searches and seizures conducted by government officials, not private entities. In this case, NCMEC receives public funding, has a charter from the United States, and serves as a designated national clearinghouse for child pornography reports. As such, the court assumed that NCMEC was part of the government.
The court then considered whether Dropbox was acting as a private entity or a government agent. Blocker pointed out that NCMEC had agreed to provide Dropbox with software to assist in detecting child pornography on its servers. In exchange, Dropbox agreed to notify NCMEC when it detected such material. Blocker therefore argued that Dropbox was effectively acting as a government entity bound by the Fourth Amendment and that its search of his files was unconstitutional.
The court was unconvinced by Blocker’s argument, comparing the relationship between Dropbox and NCMEC to that between Federal Express (FedEx) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The court explained that FedEx routinely informs the DEA when it discovers illegal drugs in packages. The Seventh Circuit also emphasized that multiple circuits, including its own, have held that these searches by FedEx constitute private activity. Accordingly, the court questioned whether Dropbox’s actions were materially different.
The court acknowledged that federal law requires Dropbox to report known child pornography. However, it emphasized that these laws do not require Dropbox to actively monitor user data to discover such material. Thus, the Seventh Circuit found that Dropbox independently chooses whether to search the contents of users’ files.
The court then examined why Dropbox monitors users’ files and reports child pornography to NCMEC. It explained that if Dropbox monitored data to carry out duties imposed by NCMEC, it might be acting as a government agent. However, that was not the case.
During discovery, Dropbox stated that it “has a private business interest in enforcing” its ban on child pornography. Dropbox also explained that it had an interest in “keeping its platform safe for account holders and others by voluntarily searching for and removing this content.”
In other words, Dropbox was concerned that users might stop using its services if the platform facilitated the distribution of child pornography. The court found that this constituted a private business motive, supporting the conclusion that Dropbox’s search was private activity. Therefore, Dropbox’s search was not subject to the Fourth Amendment.
The court then considered whether Blocker had consented to the search of his files by agreeing to Dropbox’s terms of service. Blocker again argued that the terms were merely “fine print” that he and other users accepted to access the service.
The court examined the terms of service and found that the language allowed Dropbox to examine files at its discretion and disclose their contents for five specified reasons, including the discovery of child pornography.
The court further explained that the language of the service agreement did not depend on whether a government entity had an interest in the files. Rather, the terms stated that Dropbox may examine and disclose file contents, not that it must do so. Thus, the court found that users had consented to Dropbox reviewing their files.
The court also cited its prior decision in United States v. Adkinson, in which it enforced a consumer contract. In Adkinson, T-Mobile provided agents with cell-site data to help identify individuals who had robbed one of its stores. Ultimately, the court held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the defendant had “voluntarily consent[ed] in advance to a search as a condition of receiving contracted services.”
The Seventh Circuit found no material difference between the consent provided through Dropbox’s terms of service and the consent given in Adkinson. Accordingly, the court concluded that Blocker had consented to Dropbox examining his files and disclosing information when appropriate, without requiring probable cause or a warrant.
The court noted that the pending Supreme Court decision in Chatrie v. United States, which has since been released, could influence its reasoning if the Supreme Court addressed consent. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that Blocker consented to Dropbox searching his files when he agreed to its terms of service.
Key Takeaways
Blocker emphasizes the importance of a platform’s terms of service, as a provider’s authorized scanning and reporting may generate an initial investigative lead that withstands a Fourth Amendment challenge.
In these cases, it is crucial to preserve the chain of events from the provider’s initial detection and subsequent agency reporting through the issuance of a search warrant. Officers must document precisely what the provider did and under which terms of service it acted to distinguish a private company’s review from government action.
United States v. Blocker, 174 F.4th 587 (7th Cir. 2026)