The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently examined United States v. Fellmy, a case that highlights how a canine’s brief, instinctive behavior during a lawful exterior sniff is not a Fourth Amendment violation without officer encouragement or facilitation.
Summary of the Facts
In Mercer County, Kentucky, Deputy Michael Raisor received an anonymous tip that Steven Fellmy was trafficking drugs in a silver Ford Mustang with a black racing stripe. Later, Deputy Raisor saw a car that matched the description. After observing a non-illuminated license plate and a failure to signal, Deputy Raisor initiated a traffic stop. Once Deputy Raisor obtained Fellmy’s information, he verified that the license plate and name matched the police department’s records and the anonymous tip. Deputy Raisor then called for backup. Once the canine unit arrived, the officers ordered Fellmy to step out of the vehicle. After he complied, the officers asked if they could search his vehicle, which Fellmy refused. Instead, Corporal Isaac Shelton initiated a dog sniff for the presence of drugs. Tyra, the drug dog, walked around the vehicle. When she reached the open driver’s side window, Corporal Shelton tapped on the windowsill. Tyra jumped onto the car door and sniffed but did not alert to the presence of drugs. Corporal Shelton repeated the process on the passenger side. When Tyra jumped onto the passenger windowsill, her nose partially entered the car through the open window, and she alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers then searched both the interior of the vehicle and Fellmy’s person, finding a large bag of crystal methamphetamine and heroin.
Fellmy was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of meth with intent to distribute. Fellmy filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was unconstitutionally seized when he was ordered to exit the vehicle and that Tyra’s contact with the interior of the car turned the sniff into an unconstitutional search since it involved a physical intrusion without a warrant or probable cause. At the evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Fellmy was not seized, as officers can order a driver out of their car for safety reasons. The court also concluded that Corporal Shelton did not prompt or facilitate Tyra putting her head into the vehicle. Ultimately, the district court denied Fellmy’s motion to suppress, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first examined Fellmy’s claim that he was unlawfully seized during the traffic stop. Fellmy argued that being ordered to step out of his vehicle was unreasonable since he was only asked to exit the vehicle to perform a dog sniff. Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, officers can always order a driver out of their car during a lawful police stop to help minimize danger for both the driver and officers. Here, Fellmy admitted to failing to signal for a right turn, therefore committing a traffic violation. Since officers can lawfully stop a driver for a traffic violation, Officer Raisor conducted a lawful police stop. Therefore, the court concluded Fellmy was not unlawfully seized.
The court then turned to Fellmy’s claim that the dog sniff was an unconstitutional search. Under Supreme Court precedent, a search under the Fourth Amendment can be defined in two different ways. One way is outlined by Katz v. United States, which defines a Fourth Amendment search as occurring when an official intrudes on an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Further expanding Katz, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Place that an officer does not violate a driver’s reasonable expectation of privacy when walking a trained drug dog around a lawfully stopped car to sniff for drugs. The Court reasoned that since drug dogs only alert to the presence of drugs, everything in the car remains private except the drugs. However, no one can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in illegal contraband. In this case, Fellmy had been lawfully pulled over for committing a traffic violation. Further, Tyra was a trained and certified drug dog. Therefore, when she alerted to the presence of drugs, Officer Shelton did not commit a Fourth Amendment search under Katz.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in both Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones define the other type of search as occurring when an official “physically intrud[es] on” constitutionally protected property in “an attempt to find something or to obtain information.” Jones further held that “Katz’s ‘reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test’ was ‘added to, not substituted for’ this property-based test.” Fellmy relied upon the Sixth Circuit case United States v. Sharp, where the court held that when dogs take “instinctive” actions, like jumping into a car, a Fourth Amendment search does not occur unless the officers “encouraged or facilitated” the dog’s action. Using Sharp, Fellmy alleged that it was an unconstitutional search since Corporal Shelton directed Tyra to jump on both doors and stick her head into the car. However, the court disagreed and distinguished his case from Sharp. The court emphasized that in Sharp, the dog fully jumped through an open window and explored the car’s interior. In this case, Tyra only partially stuck her head inside an open window. Moreover, the officers only directed her to jump onto the doors’ windowsills. Corporal Shelton never signaled for Tyra to go inside the car by patting the interior or through any other signal. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that Tyra “instinctive[ly]” leaned her head toward the open car windows to sniff.
Additionally, Fellmy already had the vehicle’s windows open when the stop was initiated. Thus, the court found that neither Deputy Raisor nor Corporal Shelton had a duty to close the windows before the dog sniff under Sharp. Therefore, the court found that Tyra was acting on canine instinct and not a signal when she put her head inside the open window and rejected Fellmy’s argument under Sharp.
Fellmy also argued under Jardines and United States v. Jones that Tyra physically intruded onto his private property to find information when she “[stood] on her hind legs and [stuck] her nose into the interior of the car.” The court agreed that part of the Jones test was met since a car is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Further, the court agreed that Tyra’s presence and alleged trespass were intended to obtain information because she was trying to check for drugs when sniffing the open car windows. However, the court concluded that her sniffing the free air around Fellmy’s vehicle did not constitute a search under Jones. Here, Tyra made incidental contact when performing the sniffs. The majority of Tyra, including her nose, did not make contact with the vehicle. The most contact with the car came when her front paws rested on the windowsills for a very brief period. The court found that this was not prolonged, continuous contact or the type of “physical intrusion” that falls under Jones. Thus, the court rejected Fellmy’s Jones argument. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Fellmy’s motion to suppress.
Key Takeaways
Fellmy emphasizes that a clean, exterior sniff of a lawfully stopped vehicle is generally safe under the Fourth Amendment. As this case illustrates, it is important that officers do not manipulate the vehicle by opening any doors or adjusting any windows, and it is crucial to let the dog work on its own so that the search does not risk becoming an unconstitutional search.
United States v. Fellmy, No. 25-5381 (6th Cir. 2026)