The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently decided Byers v. Painter, 173 F.4th 155 (4th Cir. 2026), a case examining the limits of qualified immunity when an officer uses deadly force against an armed but nonthreatening suspect who is fleeing. The court held that, at the time of the encounter, clearly established law prohibited the use of deadly force against an armed suspect who did not pose an immediate threat. Although Byers was suspected of a serious but nonviolent attempted breaking and entering, openly possessed a deadly weapon, and repeatedly ignored commands to drop it, he made no threatening or furtive movements towards the officers or others. After the suspect was shot three times, he turned and fled, leading the court to conclude that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.
Summary of the Facts
In July 2023, Charles Byers’s mother took him to the hospital for treatment for his worsening schizoaffective disorder. A local magistrate issued a temporary detention order, and Byers was taken to jail. On July 8th, he was released, walked to his parents’ neighborhood, and “wandered around” for hours, unable to locate their home. A 911 caller reported to Chesterfield County Police Department that Byers had attempted to enter their home, tried opening a neighbor’s door, and then entered another neighbor’s garage. Dispatch informed the responding officers that there had been an attempted breaking and entering and vandalism at a residence. The first officer who arrived saw Byers barefoot in a driveway, holding a hatchet at his side below his waist. She drew her firearm and repeatedly ordered him to drop it. Shortly after, Officer Gordon Painter arrived. He pulled his vehicle in front of Byers, exited, and immediately pointed his gun at Byers while issuing similar commands. Byers moved through the front yard, briefly moving towards Painter. He then walked into the street and began backing away while facing the officers, keeping the hatchet lowered at his side. Byers then asked Painter about his gun. Painter urged him to put the hatchet down. The first officer announced that she would deploy “less lethal” force, drew her taser, and fired after Byers ignored another command to drop the hatchet. It was unclear whether the taser made effective contact, but Byers continued to back away while still facing the officers. Painter ordered Byers to drop the hatchet two more times, but Byers refused and told the officers to “come get it.” At this point, Byers was 25 feet away from the officers when he turned his head to look over his shoulder. Painter then fired three shots while Byers was partially turned away. Byers then turned fully and ran down the street from the officers. Painter fired three or four additional rounds, striking Byers in the back. Byers ran a short distance, collapsed, and was handcuffed. He died shortly after, and his parents alleged that the later shots to the back were the fatal wounds.
Byers’s parents filed a §1983 suit against Officer Painter for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In response, Officer Painter filed a motion to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity. The district court concluded that Byers did not pose an immediate threat in the moments before he was shot and denied the motion. As a result, Painter appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Officer Painter’s use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that the violation was clearly established at the time. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Officer Painter’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.
The court began by acknowledging Officer Painter’s argument that the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Barnes v. Felix, in which the Court rejected the ‘moment of threat’ doctrine, which considered exclusively the facts and circumstances at the moment deadly force was used. Instead, Barnes required courts to assess the totality of the circumstances. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the district court applied the circuit precedent at the time, confining its analysis to the seconds surrounding the shots, and therefore had applied an incorrect standard.
The Fourth Circuit applied the framework outlined in Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, which governs excessive force claims with a standard of objective reasonableness. This requires evaluating the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or attempting to flee. In this case, Officer Painter was dispatched to an attempted breaking and entering with vandalism call. Moreover, he found Byers with a weapon near a residence. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded a reasonable officer would have understood that the reported crime severity was high and that the first Graham factor favored Painter. The court then turned to whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to officers or others. Under precedent established in Franklin v. City of Charlotte, mere possession of a weapon and failure to obey commands do not justify deadly force in the absence of a threatening or furtive movement that indicates imminent use of the weapon. In this case, the allegations and body camera footage showed that there was no such threatening motion. The hatchet stayed below Byers’s waist, and he did not swing or lunge towards the officers. Moreover, he moved away from the officers rather than towards them. His statement to “come get” the hatchet was made from about 25 feet away and was not accompanied by threatening movement. Further, Byers was fleeing with his back turned after the first rounds of shots, leaving no realistic way for him to charge or throw the hatchet at the officers when the later shots were made. Thus, Byers was not an immediate threat. Additionally, body camera footage showed only one bystander, who was standing behind the officers. Since the bystander was not close enough to be considered in immediate danger, the court found that Byers did not pose an immediate threat to others. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the second Graham factor weighed decisively against Officer Painter and the reasonableness of deadly force. Moving to the final factor, the court examined whether Byers actively resisted or attempted to flee. Under Fourth Circuit precedent in Wilson v. Prince George’s County, mere noncompliance with commands is not the same as active resistance and that deadly force must be equivalent to the level of immediate physical resistance. The court found that Byers ignored commands to drop the hatchet and slowly backed away from officers. However, he was never told to stop and did not physically resist arrest. Moreover, Byers did not run until he had already been shot. Therefore, the court found that the third factor also weighed in favor of Byers.
The Fourth Circuit addressed Officer Painter’s claim that even if his use of force was unreasonable, he is still entitled to qualified immunity since there was no clearly established right at the time that he used deadly force. Qualified immunity shields government officials from lawsuits unless they violate “clearly established” constitutional rights that a reasonable officer would have known at the time of the incident. The Fourth Circuit cited its prior decisions in Hensley v. Price, Knibbs v. Momphard, and other similar cases. In Hensley, officers shot a man holding a gun pointed at the ground who never raised it toward them. In Knibbs, an officer shot a homeowner who held a shotgun but did not aim or move it in a threatening manner. Based on these cases, the court held that failure to obey commands while possessing a weapon justifies deadly force only when accompanied by a furtive or threatening movement indicating imminent harm. Applying that principle, the court held that Painter violated Byers’s clearly established right because Byers, like Hensley and Knibbs, kept his weapon down. Further, he made no threatening gestures toward the officers but was still shot. As to the final shots to Byers’s back during his attempt to flee, the court found that a reasonable officer cannot reasonably believe that deadly force is lawful under Garner’s holding that officers may not shoot fleeing suspects who do not pose an immediate threat. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment in Painter’s use of deadly force. Thus, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity under the totality of the circumstances.
Byers v. Painter, 173 F.4th 155 (4th Cir. 2026).